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Abstract 
 
The purchase the private health insurance (PHI) as a mean to partially 
supplement the National Health System (NHS) coverage is often regarded as a 
potential signal for a declining support for the NHS. To date, the hypothesis that 
attitudes towards the NHS might be influenced by the uptake of PHI is still open to 
empirical scrutiny. Exploiting the fact that PHI is typically purchased by the most 
affluent, in this paper we test the so called ‘secession of the wealthy’ hypothesis 
whereby the likelihood of expressing “lack of support for the NHS” increases with 
having supplementary PHI. Using empirical data from Catalonia, we draw upon an 
empirical strategy that circumvents an obvious simultaneity problem by estimating 
both a recursive bivariate probit as well as an IV probit. After controlling for insurance 
premium, household income and other socio-demographic determinants, we find that 
the purchase of PHI reduces the propensity of individuals to support the NHS. We 
also find evidence that PHI is a luxury good and that, interestingly, it has a large 
price elasticity, suggesting the sensitivity of PHI purchase to fiscal incentives. 
 
Key words: private health care, health insurance, NHS reform. 
JEL Classification: I1; G1 
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1. Introduction  
 
Although in most European countries health care is predominantly state-
financed, in many countries an increasing share of the population gets medical 
treatment in the private sector. The growth of the private health care sector in Europe 
is driven by some factors such as: The inability of uniform health services to satisfy 
heterogeneous preferences for health care (Hall and Preston, 1998; Besley et al, 
1996; 1999); differences in certain quality dimensions of provision (Jofre-Bonet, 
2000a, Costa and Garcia, 2003); and, an increased consumer demand for choice 
and a direct access to providers (Propper 1993, Costa-Font and Font-Vilalta, 2004, 
Rodriguez and Stoyanova, 2004).  
Buying private health insurance has also been referred as indicative of 
‘opting-out’ whereby individuals express their lack of satisfaction with the system 
(Calnan et al., 1993) and has also been referred to as the “exit voice” (Hirchman, 
1970). Since in very few countries “leaving” the public system completely is an 
option, obtaining data to test the opting out hypothesis is extremely difficult. More 
general empirical research on individual perceptions and attitudes towards the NHS 
and purchase of private health insurance (PHI) indicate that both decisions might not 
be independent. This has been found to be the case in the United Kingdom 
(Propper, 1993; Propper, 2000, Burchardt and Propper, 2000). Nevertheless, the 
specific question of whether taking private health insurance undermines support for 
publicly funded health care controlling for relevant variables such and individual 
specific insurance premium has not been fully examined.  
The decision to ‘partially’ opt-out from the NHS – mainly for elective care 
purposes and without stopping contribution towards the NHS- by purchasing PHI  
reveals important political economy issues worth testing: On the one hand, 
individuals partially opting-out do free up resources for those NHS services that they 
do not use. Indeed, Besley and Coate (1991) show that if individuals can consume at 
most one unit of a good and given a certain quality of NHS care, consuming private 
health care implies comunsimubng care that otherwise would be NHS provided. Yet, 
if those going private are relatively well off individuals who continue to finance the 
system, their exiting the system could arguably improve the health system’s equity 
(Besley and Coate, 1991). On the other hand, health services are more likely to 
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suffer government failures (Smith et al, 2001)1. Those individuals that opt out might 
not be willing to finance the NHS in those areas that they do not use, and would 
therefore be less supportive of NHS improvements.  Hall and Preston (1998) and 
Burchardt and Propper (2000) find some empirical support for this hypothesis. 
However, those studies lacked data on relevant structural variables such as 
insurance premiums and health status which approximate the economic sacrifice 
involved in purchasing PHI and the need of health care.  
This paper aims at empirically examining whether the uptake of PHI 
influences the individual’s propensity to have a non-supportive attitude towards the 
NHS. As suggested by Hall and Preston (1998), one might well argue that common 
unobserved factors might influence both decisions and accordingly we estimate 
several specifications of the probability of showing lack of support for the NHS to 
circumvent this problem: We start with a simple probit model but then estimate an 
instrumented variables probit model and a recursive bivariate probit model to capture 
and control for  the potential correlation between the two underlying processes that’s 
stand behind these two decisions ( Fabbri et al, 2004).  
We employ data from the 1994 Catalan Health Survey (CHS), which contains 
data on health and socio-economic information as well as on insurance premiums 
and income at a representative level. Based on both fundamental and empirical 
grounds, the examination of the issue at hand with these data appears as an 
especially suitable exercise: The data was collected in Catalonia, a region-state of 
Spain, which is a paradigmatic example of a European country where health care is 
mainly tax financed – following the lines of a NHS – though 15% of total population 
has a PHI subscription and private care accounts for 25% of total health expenditure 
in 2002. In the last twenty years, the Spanish NHS has adopted as decentralised 
structure based on region-state policy responsibilities (Lopez-Casasnovas et al., 
2005). The particular region-state Catalonia exhibits a historically high share of 
individually purchased PHI. Indeed, between 22 and 25% of the population during 
1990s and up until 2003 purchased PHI. PHI is a supplementary financial 
arrangement that offers non-elective care coverage at a similar level as that provided 
by the NHS (e.g., specialist’s medical care) but at a higher perceived quality (e.g., 
lower waiting times etc)2. 
 
1 This results from short policy timetables, constant change, and demand for instant gratification that are features 
of politics do not sit comfortably with running a huge and complex service. 
2 However, PHI coverage is restricted to elective care which implies that even those individuals that are entitled 
to private health care coverage through PHI schemes would use the NHS for non-elective, urgent and high 
technology care (Lopez-Nicolas et al, 2000).   
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The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 reports a review of the 
relevant literature. Section 3, describes the institutional setting, the dataset used and 
outlines the econometric specification taken to the data. The estimation results are 
presented in section 4.  Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background  
 
A central aspect of the public policy debate to date is on the interaction 
between the public and the private sector and its underlying influences.  Besley and 
Coate (1991), Gouveia (1996) and Stiglitz (1974) suggest that individuals that opt-
out for the public sector might not be willing support economically and politically the 
allocation public sector resources to such areas, as it is the case of publicly financed 
health care. The departing argument for our paper originates in the phenomenon 
described in Besley and Coate (1991) by which health care aims at ensuring equity 
and efficiency goals. Given that it provides a relatively uniform health care financing 
it with a progressively-tax-based public funding. Thus, the public provision of health 
care may be seen as the result of a majority supporting a “guaranteed” public 
provision of health care. However, once some general coverage has been provided, 
those who benefit less by this public system, namely the high contributors may ‘opt-
out’ by buying PHI. In this context, purchase of PHI can also be interpreted as a 
signal that they would not support a quality of care improving NHS reform because it 
would lead to a higher contribution.  Since usually those in the upper income 
distribution do not constitute a sufficient majority to show a clear opposition to public 
spending, they have to content themselves by supporting low public spending and 
increasingly opting-out whenever the standards of quality of the public financed 
health care are below their personal needs.   
Nevertheless, individuals are heterogeneous in preferences for redistribution, 
and better-informed - and relatively richer individuals - might prefer privately provided 
health care (Propper and Burchardt, 1999). Thus, whether enrolling in private health 
care sector leads to a lesser support for an NHS improvement is individual specific 
and relies on observable and unobservable factors. Propper (2000) argues that if the 
extension of the private sector is accompanied by a reduction in the willingness to 
pay taxes this could drive the NHS into a ‘poor services for the poor’. In this sense, 
Propper (2000) finds empirical evidence that users of private services are richer and 
more likely to support the political right as well as less supportive of equity goals of 
the NHS. However, it is pointed out how political attitudes are in themselves 
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endogenenous and underpin other individual specific effects such as the preference 
for private sectors in general.  
In countries where the NHS provides full coverage, opting out is only partial 
and refers to buying privately some elective care which the relatively more affluent 
wish to obtain more promptly (Besley et al., 1996).  However, as explained above, 
the development of a PHI market might reduce the size of the coalition of NHS 
supporters. Therefore, although in the short run equity in the finance of the NHS 
might improve, in the long run, what we can term as the “secession of the wealthy” 
might have inverse equity effects, providing an explanation for the deterioration of 
public health care: Those opting out of the system might be willing to change the 
composition of private health care towards those procedures that they consume 
within the NHS or they might want to reduce the NHS size in order to pay fewer 
taxes. 
Empirical strategies to test the interaction between support for public sector 
and the development of the private sector are complex and limited by revelation 
problems. Indeed, first of all, rational individuals do not have incentives to reveal their 
‘true’ willingness to finance public sector activities, which is broadly known as the 
‘free rider problem’. Second, individual preferences over the re-allocation of funds to 
existing programs instead of rising taxes cannot easily be inferred either. However, 
despite of these restrictions some empirical strategies have been implemented that 
overcome some measurement limitations. Using survey and budgetary experiments 
Strauss and Hughes (1976) find that education and medical care receive a high 
priority in comparison to other government programs.  More recent studies establish 
a link between the individual expression of a private demand for a publicly provided 
good (e.g., health care) and the individual preferences for the structure of public 
services (Preston and Ridge, 1995; Hall and Preston, 1998). Using evidence of the 
Social Attitudes Survey, Preston and Ridge (1995) estimate the demand for local 
public spending taking into account potential ‘revelation biases’ associated with 
“survey” responses. 
3. The empirical application. 
 
3.1. The institutional setting  
 
Spain structures the provision and funding of health care as a system of 
regional health services, so called the NHS (Lopez Casanovas et al., 2004). The 
legal bases of the Spanish health care are the 1986 General Health Care Act and 
the 2003 Health System Quality and Cohesion Act. The Spanish health system is 
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regionally decentralized, and Catalonia was the fist region-state in taking over legal 
responsibility for healthcare from the central government in 1981. The Spanish NHS 
ensembles an increasing array of regional health authorities, to which health care 
responsibilities have been transferred progressively from 1981 up to 2002.3 Health 
care is the foremost policy making responsibility of autonomous communities along 
with education and it accounts 30-40 percent of their total public funds in their hands.  
With the exception of nine percent of funds collected at the regional level, the NHS is 
centrally financed and the regional resource allocation has turned out into a central 
block grant transfer based on of an unadjusted capitation formula. The Spanish NHS 
provides health care free of charge at the point of use except for pharmaceuticals 
and dental care. In contrast with the situation in other regions, more than half of 
Catalan health expenditure is private, and the system works on a contractual basis.4 
Furthermore, Catalonia stands jointly with the Balearic Islands as the region state 
with the lowest share of public health care spending as a share of the GDP (4%). 
Health care is one of the most politicised areas of public policy debate in 
Spain. The NHS is envisaged as a ‘prioritised’ public service, presumably fulfilling 
personal as well as socio-political goals that affect the legitimacy of the welfare 
government. According to the Spanish public opinion survey on health care 
(Barómetro Sanitario, 2000) 47 percent believe that the government should spend 
more on health care and 90 percent disagree on cost-containment in health care. 
Therefore, it seems that the public backs public investment in health rather than a 
reduction in health care expenditure. Simultaneously, 67 percent agree in that 
people should be able to supplement the NHS care by purchasing PHI. As Figure 1 
exhibits, an increasing share of the Spanish population perceives that the NHS 
worked well but needs substantial remaking. However, those who think that that the 
NHS needs to be redefined as well as those thinking that the NHS already works well 
tend to decline or remain stable over time. Therefore, some significant share of the 
population might react to the lack of the government adjustment of the health system 
to their expectations by purchasing insurance plans (25 percent in 2003).   
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
3 After Catalonia in 1981 followed Andalusia (1984), the Basque Country and Valencia (1987), Galicia and 
Navarre (1990), Canary Islands (1994) and finally completed in 2002 to the remaining ten regions 
4 PHI in Spain provides coverage against the need of having to pay private medical treatment out of pocket. 
With the exception of civil servants, choosing substitutive PHI (which is done by less than 5% of the population 
in Catalonia), PHI purchasers have double coverage. 
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The Spanish Insurance Law defines PHI – so called ‘Seguro de Asistencia 
Sanitaria’ - as an insurance that “provides to the insured with the medical, hospital 
and surgery care, with own staff of doctors whereby the insurer takes care of its own 
enrolees in exchange of a premium”. Unlike in other EU countries, insurance policies 
are mainly individually (rather than corporately) purchased and, typically, benefits are 
received in kind rather than reimbursed to the patient. Normally, to control ex-ante 
moral hazard after purchasing PHI there is at least a 6-month period by which no 
claims can be satisfied with the exception of urgent care.5 Contracts have an 
undetermined duration and can be cancelled by both insurer and insured. The 
majority of insurance policies purchased are for medical care, usually under the form 
of indemnity.6 Previous research using data from Catalonia (Costa-Font and García, 
2003, Costa-Font and García 2002, and Costa-Font and Font-Vilalta, 2004) indicates 
that demographic variables are important determinants in the purchase of PHI, and 
for instance, the share of PHI increases up until the age of 30. The largest share of 
the Catalan private health insurance market is concentrated in Barcelona (78.6 
percent of the insured), which represents around 23 percent of the total population in 
Barcelona. In Tarragona, Girona and Lleida 17 percent, 22 percent and 22 percent of 
the population buys PHI, respectively.  
3.2.  The data 
We use data from the Catalan Health Survey (CHS, 1994). This is a cross-
sectional health survey of 15,000 individuals living in Catalonia and was collected 
during the autumn 1993. This survey - usually undertaken every five years – is a 
representative survey of the eight Catalan health regions. Besides standard detailed 
social and demographic information, it provides information on health service 
utilization and on attitudes towards the NHS. Although the data is not the latest 
survey, the most recent data on 2002, does not contain income information which 
makes it less suitable for our purposes.  
[Insert Table 1 about here]  
 
We include variables reflecting individual’s income, age, gender and 
education as based on previous literature we know they have a significant impact on 
the decision to purchase PHI and may do also on the propensity to support the NHS 
support.  
 
5 This includes obstetric care wich has a period of 1 year without claims and specific interventions are excluded 
(e.g., vasectomies, prosthesis etc). 
6 Reimbursement policies do not seem to be in high demand despite having been offered for a long time. 
Recently dental care policies have been developed and introduced fully in the market, however their coverage is 
limited to the 9.1% of the population. 
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As displayed in Table 1, our sample is made of 48 percent men and 52 
percent of female respondents. The average age of the respondents in our sample is 
about 40 years. Twenty-one percent of the sample has some primary education, 55 
percent primary studies, 13 percent secondary studies and 11 percent superior 
education. The average number of family members in our sample is 3.68 and 51 
percent of the sample is married, the average income is was €12,591.46  in 1994 
and the average health status is about good or at 3 out of 5, where 5 are worst 
possible health and 1 is best possible health. Seven percent of the respondents feel 
they have an excellent health, 16.5 percent that they have very good health; 52 
percent that they have good health; about 20 percent think they have regular health 
and about 4.25 percent feel they have bad health. Looking at health status and PHI, 
we observe that among those who are insured, 18.3 percent perceived their health to 
be bad, from which 53 percent were elderly.  
Those who purchase PHI individually are 19 percent of the sample and only 5 
percent perceived that the system should be reformed completely. The two questions 
of the CHS that we use to measure PHI purchase and lack of support for the NHS 
are the following:  • Do you currently hold any voluntary (private) health insurance policy?  
 • Which of the following statements define your personal attitude towards the NHS:  
a) No changes are needed; b) Some small changes are needed; 
c) Significant changes required; d) the NHS should be completely changed. 
 
Note that the way the question is formulated answering that the NHS needs to 
be ‘changed completely’ reflects a general political negative attitude towards the 
NHS and its role in society, and thus we believe that CHS successfully measures 
‘lack of support for the NHS’. 
Table 2 provides evidence of the interactions between support for the NHS 
and purchase of PHI.  Looking at the object of our interest, we find that of those that 
buy PHI, almost nine percent has a negative attitude towards the NHS and thinks 
that the NHS needs to be completely changed. And, of those that think that the NHS 
should be completely changed, almost 29 percent buy PHI.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
As Table 2 shows, PHI subscription and lack of NHS support are more likely 
for those more affluent and married. Gender and health seem not to place any effect 
while education is higher for those that purchase PHI and support less the NHS.  
 
3.3. The Econometric specification 
 
The empirical work developed here is based on the assumption that 
individuals decide to purchase PHI7 maximizing their expected utility and that this 
decision is contingent on their income; the PHI premium; and on other observable 
individual characteristics given a certain public health care quality. As discussed in 
Browning and Meghir (1991) and as applied by others in other contexts (see Mellor 
1997 and French et al. 2004, for instance), this interpretation of the PHI demand a 
conditional structural demand model simplifies the empirical analysis enormously. 
We take thus this approach and assume that both PHI purchase decision and 
propensity to support the NHS are conditional on a set public health care quality. 
Even though the decision of purchasing PHI and supporting or not the NHS 
are very likely to be simultaneous processes, we argue here that attitudes towards 
the NHS may be state dependent. In this sense, partially opting out (buying PHI) 
might reinforce previously held attitudes against or in favour of the NHS.  
In this paper, we interpret that PHI purchase might influence individuals 
attitude towards the NHS. Thus, we specify the following equation for the decision of 
buying PHI as:  
iii ZI μβ +=* ,        (1) 
where Ii* is a latent variable representing the individual’s propensity to buy PHI, Zi is 
a vector of observable individual characteristics and μi the idiosyncratic error term.  
Since *I is not directly observable, we define a dichotomous decision variable 
I which takes value 1 when we observe PHI purchase and 0 otherwise so that I=1. 
Thus, assuming a normal distribution with 0 mean and variance 1 for the random 
error μi, this model can be estimated using a probit model:  
)()0(Pr)0(Pr)1(Pr '* βμβ iii zZobIobIob Φ=>+=>== ,      (2) 
where Zi is as above and Ф is the standard normal cumulative distribution.  
On the other hand, we assume that the individual’s latent propensity to have a 
negative attitude towards the NHS depends on observable and unobservable 
characteristics and also on the fact of having locked in a PHI contract already. Thus, 
the latent attitude towards the NHS, A
 i
*, can be modelled as: 
                            ,                                      (3) iiii IXA εδα ++=*
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7 Although not entirely accurate in Spain, we assume that buying PHI individually or through the employer is 
equivalent. 
where Xi is a vector of observable variables, εi is a normally distributed random 
variable, and Ii the indicator variable for having purchased PHI.  
The propensity to have a negative attitude towards the NHS is unobserved but 
we assume that the individual has a negative attitude towards the NHS and answers 
that he/she would reform the NHS completely. By defining Ai as an indicator variable 
that takes value 1 when the individual answers he/she would reform completely the 
NHS and 0 otherwise, we get the following expression: 
                                                     (4) 
 
0 if 0
0 if 1
                                                                           
*
*
⎩⎨⎧ ≤>= AAAi
Again, the probability that the individual has a negative attitude towards the 
NHS can be modelled as a probit model: 
)()0(Pr)0(Pr)1(Pr
* IXIXobAobAob iiiiii ⋅+Φ=>+⋅+=>== δαεδα ,           (5) 
where again Ф is the normal cumulative distribution function; Ai is an indicator 
variable for the individual’s attitude towards the NHS; and εi is a random variable 
normally distributed with mean zero and unit variance.  
Note that the coefficient δ in equation (5) will be biased if as expected, there is 
some simultaneity problem between both decision processes due for instance to 
common explanatory unobserved heterogeneity. Examples of these non-
exogeneous unobserved characteristics are the individual’s perception of the NHS 
quality of care, the political views of the individual, or the individual’s family medical 
record in the NHS, for instance. Because of the correlation of the two processes’ 
unobserved heterogeneity, the estimation of the model above by Maximum 
Likelihood would produce a biased coefficient estimate for δ.  The estimate would 
confound the structural effects of buying PHI on lack of support for the NHS with the 
effects of the correlation between the unobserved heterogeneities present in both 
processes. There are different methods to estimate equations 2 and 5 circumventing 
this problem.  
Our approach is to present a set of solutions where we address the different 
problems faced: 
We first approach is to assume that the error terms of both PHI purchase and 
attitude formation are uncorrelated so that we can treat PHI as exogenous (column 1 
of Table 2).  Using these coefficients, we used a simple two step procedure 
suggested by Wooldridge (2002) and tested for the endogeneity of I* in equation 5 
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and the simultaneity of equations 2 and 5. This test is valid for binary variables and 
does not require normality or homocedasticity of errors terms. Although we could not 
reject the hypothesis of exogeneity, for comparative reasons we thereafter treat the 
variable I in equation 5 as both endogeneous and exogenous.   
Secondly, we estimate two bi-probits models:  
- In the presence of a weak correlation between the instruments and the 
endogenously determined explanatory variable, Greene 1998 and 2000 suggest that 
the bivariate probit model may be more appropriate and more efficient. The 
assumption that μi and εi are distributed as a bivariate normal with E(μi)=E(εi)=0, 
Var(μi)=Var(εi)=1, and cov(μi, εi)=ρ, allows for the possibility that that the 
unobservables affecting attitude, Ai, and the purchase of PHI, Ii, are related. Because 
the both variables are bivariate, the likelihood function is a bivariate probit. The 
estimation of a bivariate probit model produces both unbiased estimates of β and α 
and an estimate of ρ, the covariance between the error terms: 
);,();,();,();,(),,(
0,01,00,11,1
ραβραβραβραβραβ iiAIiiAIiiAIiiAI ZXZXZXZXL iiiiiiii −−ΦΠ×−ΦΠ×−ΦΠ×ΦΠ= ========
   (6) 
where β and α are the parameters associated with the reduced forms of equations 2 
and 5, respectively; X and Z are the exogeneous regressors; and Φ the cumulative 
bivariate normal distribution function.  
Note that with the bivariate probit approach we can only estimate a reduced 
form so that we do not obtain an estimate of δ but we can test the sign of correlation 
between the error terms in equation 2 and 5.  
- Given that there might admittedly be some reverse causation, we control for the 
existence of such effects by means of a recursive bivariate probit model. This model 
follows the lines of Madala recursive systems number 5 (Fabbri et al, 2004) and 
allows us to undertake an additional robustness check of the influence of PHI on 
individuals attitudes towards the NHS.  
Finally, we use an instrumental variable method for binary dependent variables. 
This involves the estimation of equation 5 as a two-stage probit model using 
instrumental variables to correct for the endogeneity of Ii. The two-stage probit model 
is estimated using the routine “ivprob” of the Stata software. This routine was 
programmed by Joseph Harkness which implements the Amemiya Generalized 
Least Squares (AGLS) estimators for probit and tobit with an endogenous regressor 
as described in Newey (1987). The endogenous regressors are treated as linear 
functions of the instruments and the other exogenous variables.  
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Given that some argue that the effect of PHI might be not be on lack of support 
but on eroding previous support to the system, we run an ordered probit model 
assuming exogeneity of the PHI parameters after checking that  and extract the 
marginal effects.  
 
4. Results 
 
Table 2 provides the results of different models: Column or panel 1 reports the 
results of the simple probit model of the variable “lack of support” for the NHS. The 
second panel reports the results of the bivariate probit model that does correct for 
the potential endogeneity of the variable lack of support for the NHS. The third panel 
reports the results of the recursive bivariate probit model that does correct for the 
potential endogeneity of the variable lack of support for the NHS and the potential 
reverse causality. Column four reports the IV probit model for lack of support that 
does correct for the endogeneity of the variable lack of support for the NHS but not 
for the fact that PHI is binary – this is included just for comparative reasons as the 
variable PHI does not appear to be exogenous in the test performed.  
Table 3 provides the marginal effects of the independent variables for models 
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, i.e., assuming both endogeneity or exogeneity of PHI. 
 Below we discuss our results analyzing the effect that each of the variables 
included has on the probability of lacking support for the NHS:  
-Lack of support and PHI: In order to provide a robust response to the question 
posed by the paper, we first examine the effect of PHI on lack of NHS support in 
Table 3.  First of all, we find that holding PHI unambiguously increases the 
probability of lack of support towards the NHS regardless of the specification 
examined. Table 4 we find that assuming exogeneity does not change significantly 
the marginal effect of PHI on this propensity. 
 
- The effect of other health and socio-demographic variables:  
-Education and “lack of support for the NHS”: Having lower education than a College 
degree influences negatively the likelihood of reporting “lack of support for the NHS” 
(see Table 3). In other words, higher levels of education – which is a well-accepted 
indicator of higher income levels - make it less likely to have a negative perception of 
the NHS. Age exhibits a non-linear effect so that years of life make it more likely to 
be critical of the NHS. Consistently, health status goes the opposite way. Males are 
less likely to reveal being supportive of the NHS when the confounding effect of the 
unobservables is corrected.  
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-The role of income and PHI: Income is among the variables that determine the 
decision to purchase PHI. Note that the effect of the logarithm of income on the 
decision of buying PHI is very strong at about 0.7 for both the two biprobit models 
(columns 2 and 3 in Table 2). This suggests that PHI is a normal good and is 
consistent with some previous studies (Costa-Font and Garcia, 2003). The 
interpretation of this result is that an income expansion leads to an expansion of the 
market for supplementary health care in Spain. The dummy variable “no income 
reported” often associated to high income levels8 is very significant and about 0.11-
0.14 for both biprobits.  
-The role of income and Lack of Support for the NHS: With respect to the effect of 
income on the lack of support for the NHS, we see that it is negative but insignificant 
when we do not correct for the potential endogeneity of PHI but becomes significant 
and still negative when we do (third specification).  
 
PHI premium and PHI: As expected, the effect of the logarithm of the insurance 
premium is always negative and about -1.3. Moreover, the implied price elasticity of 
PHI demand evaluated at the mean premium are about -0.3, indicating that potential 
subscribers are sensitive to potential changes in insurance premium, and in 
particular, that a subsidisation of the insurance premium would yield an expansion of 
the market for supplementary PHI in Spain.   
 
-Goodness of fit measures: Note that the likelihood ratio specification tests reported 
at the bottom of all models are satisfactory. The significance of the Rho-error term of 
the correlation estimate at the bottom of column 3 indicates that there exists 
correlation between the error terms of equations 2 and 5. 
 
Finally, in Table 5 we provide the results of an ordered probit model as well as 
the marginal effects of the different levels of attitude towards the NHS. Interestingly, 
age still displays a non-linear effect but income is significant: those relatively more 
affluent, those with PHI and with worse health status are more likely to exhibit lack of 
support for the NHS. The three columns on the right hand side of the table confirm 
these effects: income and PHI especially affect negatively the probability of believing 
 
8 Income imputation methods to assign income to those not reporting it indicated that not reporting income is 
associated with very high levels of income. 
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the NHS does not need big changes, but positively the likelihood of considering that 
the NHS needs significant or extensive changes.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper provides an examination of the relationship between individual 
propensity to (not to) support the NHS and the expansion of the market for 
supplementary PHI in the context of Spain. After confirming that PHI is a luxury 
good, we find individuals buying PHI exhibit a lesser support for the NHS. This is a 
robust result that under different specifications corresponding to different assumption 
on the simultaneous nature of the association between PHI uptake and attitudes 
towards the NHS.  
We have dealt with the contemporaneous association between the support for 
the NHS and decision of buying PHI. To control for the existence of potential 
endogeneity problems when estimating PHI purchase and propensity to have a 
negative attitude towards the NHS, we choose to estimate both processes as a two-
stage probit model as well as a bivariate probit model. Our results suggest that PHI 
makes reporting “lack of support for the NHS” more likely. In the same direction, the 
positive sign o the error term correlation between these two decision variables when 
estimated using a bivariate probit model corroborates this implication. We find that 
the demand for PHI affects negatively the propensity to show support towards the 
NHS, even when we control for social-demographic factors, income and premium 
paid. Interestingly, ordered probit models suggest that this effect remains when 
several attitudes are examined at the same time. The rough data already suggests 
that big changes needed at the NHS halves when individuals have PHI. Empirical 
specifications that attempt to control for some for of reverse causality suggest a 
milder though still significant effect. This suggests that even when a revolt of the rich 
is not expectable at current levels, it might well be that if private health care reached 
a certain level this could be a plausible reaction.   
The results obtained provide some empirical support to the interpretation of 
“purchasing PHI” as an expression of at least “partial or ideological” “opting-out” the 
NHS provision. These results also provide some diffuse support to the hypothesis of 
the ‘revolt of the rich’ in the sense that we show that education has a positive effect 
on the likelihood of showing “lack of support for the NHS” and education is typically 
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associated with higher levels of wealth. Along the same line, we find that, when 
estimating the decision to buy PHI without accounting for the fact that “lack of 
support for the NHS” is potentially endogeneous, income seems to be picking up part 
of the effect of “lack of support for the NHS” on the decision to buy PHI. This mildly 
corroborates the association of “lack of support for the NHS” and higher levels of 
income. 
From this, it is not far fetched to conclude that some of the effect of income, 
age and health on the decision of buying PHI reported in previous literature ( Costa-
Font and Garcia, 2003)  may have been picking up the effect of the omitted variable 
“lack of support for the NHS”. The fact that the reduced form reflected by the biprobit 
model which corrects for the unobserved heterogeneity influencing both PHI and 
“lack of support for the NHS”, does produce similar coefficients than the simple 
probits of PHI and NHS only reinforces this belief. 
Given that individuals are usually assumed to support increases in NHS 
spending if their willingness to pay for expanded/better coverage exceeds the tax 
costs that they would face (Brook, Preston and Hall, 1998), household income is 
likely to determine the ability to pay for PHI as well as the preferences for certain 
sources of public spending, i.e. influencing both PHI purchase and “lack of support 
for the NHS”. But, interestingly in this paper, we show that even when controlling for 
income, household characteristics, and premium paid, a “negative attitude towards 
the NHS” still influences very strongly the likelihood of purchasing PHI and takes 
away some of the effect of the other socio-demographic variables.  
One policy related interpretation of our findings is that increases in the size of 
the market for supplementary health insurance might have effects that are not 
obvious. Since that those that opt-out completely or partially are usually unsatisfied 
with the NHS, and wealthier individuals have low incentives to support costly NHS 
reforms, a potential long run effect might be shrinking the size of the welfare state in 
those areas where the NHS competes with the private sector  
It is worth mentioning some caveats as well. Mainly, that we have used data 
from a specific region-state of Spain to test the above hypothesis. Thus, our 
database is representative of Catalonia rather than Spain as a whole, and Catalonia 
has the particular characteristic of having a long tradition of private health care. Our 
database is from 1994 and does not contain data for other years. Therefore, we 
cannot control for dynamic effects whereas one might argue that there is some ‘habit 
formation’ in the decision to purchase PHI and also some persistence of a negative 
attitude towards the NHS. Furthermore, we concentrate in individual rather than 
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corporate finance PHI given that the market share of the latter was negligible in 
1994. Also, although the implication of this is uncertain, there is some indication that 
those purchasing PHI keep using the public system (Vera-Hernández, 1999; and 
López et al 2000). Finally, our results indicate some evidence of the 
contemporaneous effects of support for the NHS and PHI; whilst one might well 
argue that there is some delay in individuals’ partial opting out decision. However, 
data availability does not allow us to examine these effects as far as no panel data 
evidence is available.  
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Figure 1. NHS Support  in Spain 1993-2002 (% of responses) 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable 
Number of 
observation
s 
Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Interpretation 
Dependent Variable(s) 
Lack of NHS 
Support 
1500 5% 23% % of individuals who have a negative perception of 
the NHS (they think that it should be reformed 
completely) 
No Change 15000 40.49%  % of individuals who have a negative perception of 
the NHS (they think that no changes are needed) 
Some Change 15000 47.36%  % of individuals who have a negative perception of 
the NHS (they think that some changes are 
needed) 
Significant 
Changes 
15000 6.62%  % of individuals who have a negative perception of 
the NHS (they think that significant changes are 
needed) 
Treatment Variable 
PHI 15000 19% 39% Percentage of privately insured 
Independent Variables 
Age 15000 39.61 22.93 Age in years 
Male 15000 48% 50% Percentage of males 
Nmemfam 15000 3.68 1.43 Average number of family members 
Educ1 15000 21% 41% Less than primary education 
Educ2 15000 55% 50% Primary education 
Educ3 15000 13% 34% Secondary education 
Educ4 15000 11% 31% Superior Education 
Income* 15000 2,095 746.72 Income (thousands pesetas-1994) 
Excellent 
health 
15000 7.5%  Percentage of those in excellent health 
Very good 
health 
15000 16.45%  Percentage of those in very good health 
Good Health 15000 51.80%  Percentage of those in good health 
Fair Health 15000 19.91%  Percentage of those in fair health 
Bad Health 15000 4.25%  Percentage of those in bad health 
Health 15000 2.97 0.92 Average Health Status (1 to 5) 
Single 15000 40.06%  The individual is single 
Married 15000 51.21%  The individual is married 
Separated 15000 1.07%  The individual is separated 
Divorced 15000 0.41%  The individual is divorced 
Widow 15000 7.17%  The individual is a widow 
Self-employed 15000 14.57%  The individual works independently 
Employed 15000 31.49%  The individual is employed 
Unemployed 
with subsidy 
15000 
3.49% 
 Lost his/her job but has subsidy 
Unemployed 
no subsidy 
15000 
1.43% 
 lost his/her job and has no subsidy 
Disabled 15000 2.48%  The individual has some disability 
Retired 15000 11.03%  Retired 
Homemaker 15000 1.41%  Housewife or other 
Student 15000 0.01%  Actively studying 
Other 15000 0.09%  Other labour situations 
Premium** 15000 63,968.96 14,144.91 Health insurance premium (pesetas-1994) 
annual 
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No Change 15000 40.49%  % of individuals who have a negative perception of 
the NHS (they think that no changes are needed) 
Some Change 15000 47.36%  % of individuals who have a negative perception of 
the NHS (they think that some changes are 
needed) 
Significant 
Changes 
15000 6.62%  % of individuals who have a negative perception of 
the NHS (they think that significant changes are 
needed) 
Lack of NHS 
Support 
1500 5% 23% % of individuals who have a negative perception of 
the NHS (they think that it should be reformed 
completely) 
PHI 15000 19% 39% Percentage of privately insured 
Source: Catalan Health Survey, 1994, and our own. 
 
*About a third of the sample did not report their income but reported everything else. To those individuals, we 
imputed the predicted income based on age, sex, marital status, education, health, number of members in the 
family 
**We impute health insurance premium to those that have a missing value by predicting premium as a function of 
age and gender as explanatory variable. 
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Table 2: The decision to purchase PHI and  
the “Lack of support for the NHS” 
 
Model† Probit Biprobit Recursive Biprobit IV Probit 
Dependent 
variable 
Lack of 
support 
NHS 
Lack of 
support 
NHS 
PHI 
Lack of 
support 
NHS 
PHI 
Lack of 
support 
NHS 
Age 
  
0.0670***  
(0.006) 
0.0630 ** 
(0.005)
-0.011***
(0.003)
0.026***
(0.007)
0.0105** 
(0.005) 
-0.006 ***
(-0.019)
Age2 
  
-0.0010*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0010***
(0.000)
0.000001***
(0.000)
0.00001***
(0.000)
-9.2E-05 
*** 
(0.000) 
0.00003
(0.0002)
Married 
  
-0.0100 
(0.048) 
-0.0740***
(0.047)
0.032***
(0.034)
-0.015***
(0.051)
-
0.0472*** 
(0.038) 
-0.0861
(0.047)
Male 0.0240 
(0.035) 
0.0320***
(0.035)
-0.012***
(0.025)
0.050 ***
(0.036)
-
0.0224*** 
(0.029) 
0.0260**
(0.036)
Log of Income -0.059 
-(0.032) 
0.693***
(0.026)
-0.010 ***
(0.053) 
0.7127*** 
(0.030) 
0.007
(0.032)
No income 
reported-dummy 
  
0.122 
(0.0038) 
0.113***
(0.027)
-0.212 ***
(0.089)
0.140*** 
(0.032) 
0.069
(0.079)
Very good health 
  
-0.1740** 
(0.083) 
-0.1740**
(0.083)
-0.121***
(0.052)
-0.087
(0.078) 
-0.068*** 
(0.070) 
0.1481
(0.075)
Good Health 
  
-0.0450*** 
(0.072) 
-0.0440***
(0.072) 
-0.141***
(0.047)
0.039***
(0.088)
-0.111* 
(0.063) 
0.116
(0.075)
Fair health 
  
0.0510*** 
(0.081) 
0.0490***
(0.081)
-0.282***
(0.056)
0.045***
(0.122) 
-0.264*** 
(0.070) 
0.221
(0.139)
Bad health -0.0040*** 
(0.115) 
-0.0090***
(0.115)
-0.388***
(0.084)  
-0.420*** 
(0.100) 
Education 1 
  
-0.1980*** 
(0.075) 
-0.1530***
(0.075)
 
Education 2 
  
-0.1280*** 
(0.053) 
-0.1040***
(0.053)
 
Education 3 
  
0.0450*** 
(0.062) 
0.0520***
(0.062)
 
Log of Premium 
PHI 
 -1.374***
(0.105)
-
1.3219*** 
(0.117) 
Constant 
  
-2.5360*** 
(0.122) 
-2.5550***
(0.122)
4.618***
(1.157)
-1.696**
(0.783)
3.2435*** 
(1.305)  
0.221***
(0.139)
  
PHI  
 
0.578**
(0.268)
 2.7739***
-(0.005)
Rho-error term 
correlation 
0.25 
(0.041) 
0.1400***
(0.025)
    
  
LogLikelihood  -
7920.1131
-8039.789  -2160.64
Wald Test chi2(k-
1) 
-
7920.1131 
1040.61 855.18  3691.94
Prob> Chi (k-1) 1040.61 0.0000 0.0000  
Log-Likelihood 
test (rho=0) 
0.0000 43.0818 1.0378  
Prob>Chi2(k-1) 43.0818 0.3083 0.3083  
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† The number of observations used to estimate all models is 11,567 due to missing 
data 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level, respectively 
Standard Errors in brackets. 
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Table 3 Probit Model Marginal Effects for Lack of Support 
 
 Assuming 
Exogeneity
Assuming 
Endogeneity
Age 0.006**      0.005 **
Age2 -0.0001** -0.0001**
Married -0.008**      0.006 **
Male 0.004      0.001 
Log of 
Income 
0.003      0.002
No reported 
income  
0.011**      0.001 
Very good 
health 
-0.013**   -0.0111**  
Good Health -0.003 -    0.015 
Fair health 0.007      0.001 
Bad health 0.002      0.008 
PHI 0.061**      0.056** 
 
** Indicates significance at a 5% level and *** at the 1%. 
Table 4: Ordered Probit for Lack of Support 
 
  Level of changes needed in the 
NHS 
 Ordered Probit None-
Some  
Some-
Significant
Significant
-Totally  
 Coeff             st error    
Age 0.0147** (0.0035) -
0.0057**
0.0028** 0.0013** 
Age2 -
0.0002** 
(0.000001) 0.0001** 0.00004 0.0001 
Married -0.0367 (0.0283) 0.0142 -0.0071 -0.0033 
Male -0.0076 (0.0209) 0.0030 -0.0015 -0.0007 
Log of 
Income 
0.1081** (0.0205) -
0.0418**
0.0210** 0.0095** 
No income 
reported-
dummy 
0.1821 (0.0230) -
0.0698**
0.0332** 0.0164** 
Very good 
health 
0.0220 (0.0529) -
0.0085**
0.0042** 0.0020** 
Good Health 0.0908 (0.0477) -0.0352 0.0177 0.0080 
Fair health 0.1449** (0.0522) -
0.0555**
0.0262** 0.0131** 
Bad health 0.1541** (0.0696) -
0.0585**
0.0262** 0.0142** 
PHI 0.2543** (0.0263) -
0.0961**
0.0423** 0.0235** 
1μ  1.5610 (0.3074)    
2μ  3.0114 (0.3080)    
3μ  3.4419 (0.3081)    
4μ  4.4345 (0.3110)    
Log-
Likelihood 
-
12,878.4
6  
   
 
** Indicates significance at a 5% level. 
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